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The Consent of the Governed: Recall 
of United States Senators 
Timothy Zick * 
The power under the Constitution will always be in the People. 
It is entrusted for certain defined purposes, and for a certain 
limited period, to representatives of their own chusing; and 
whenever it is executed contrary to their Interest, or not agreeable 
to their wishes, their Servants can, and widoubtedly will be, 
recalled. 1 
I. Introduction 
Our government ultimately rests upon the notion of popular 
consent.2 Yet many of the Framers, most notably James Madison, 
harbored a deep-seated fear that the passions of the people, left 
unchecked, would be democracy's undoing. The institution of 
representative government was intended to filter, and thereby 
control, the passions, partisanship, and self-interest of the masses 
"through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom 
may best discern the true interest of their country and whose 
patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to 
temporary or partial considerations. "3 In the main, the Framers 
* B.A., Indiana University, 1989; J.D., Georgetown University Law Center, 1992. Law 
clerk for the Honorable Levin H. Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge, United States Court of 
Appeals for the First Circuit. The author wishes to thank Madeleine Tirnin, Stephen Engle, 
Lisa Billowitz, and Jamie Wacks for reviewing earlier drafts of this article. Without their 
encouragement and very helpful suggestions, this project would not have been completed. 
Any errors that remain are the author's alone. 
1. George Washington, quoted in 1 DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION 305, 306-07 (B. 
Bailyn ed. 1990). · 
2. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE provides, in part: 
We hold these truths to be self-evident; that all men are created equal; that they 
are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these are 
life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; that to secure these rights, governments 
are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the 
governed .... 
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. X (U.S. 1776). 
3. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 126 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed. 1987) 
[hereinafter THE FEDERALIST]. 
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have earned praise for the system they devised to keep the peoples' 
passions in check. 
This is not to say that popular or direct democracy, under 
which the people decide how they wish to be governed, has not had 
its moments, particularly in recent years.4 The people of twenty-
two states, for example, began in 1990 to enact laws that restricted 
access to the election ballot for long-time congressional incumbents 
or limit the number of terms an individual could serve in the House 
or Senate. These "term limits" provisions were narrowly rejected 
by the Supreme Court in United States Term Limits, Inc. v. 
Thornton5 on the ground that they were "contrary to the 'funda-
mental principle of our representative democracy,' embodied in the 
Constitution, that 'the people should choose whom they please to 
govern.'"6 
The recent impeachment proceedings against President Clinton 
have afforded an opportunity for us once again to test the Framers' 
prescience. It has been commonly said that Madison and company 
were correct- that ultimately it was the disinterested and temperate 
Senate that saved the day by acquitting the president of all charges. 
But this praise for the Framers ignores the wisdom of the people, 
who concluded long before the president's acquittal that he ought 
not be removed from office. It was the public that was disinterest-
ed and temperate, urging in every opinion poll that the Senate 
censure rather than remove, condemn but not impeach. The 
"factious tempers"7 Madison warned of were displayed not by the 
4. The methods chosen for enforcing the will of the people upon Members of Congress 
are as old as the nation itself and as varied as the people of the several states. The method 
chosen by Kentucky voters in 1832 was perhaps the crudest in history. Senator Humphrey 
Marshall, returning from Washington after casting his vote in favor of ratification of the 
controversial Jay's Treaty, narrowly escaped his constituents' ire: 
(H]e was seized by a mob, and rushed to a muddy pond, into which he was about 
to be thrown, when he reminded the rioters that it was the practice of persons, 
previous to being baptized, to relate their experience . . . . He thereupon made 
a witty speech, and "was conducted to his home with every mark of respect that 
such a rabble was capable of manifesting to him." 
WILLIAM PLUMER, MEMORANDUM OF PROCEEDINGS IN THE U.S. SENATE, 1803-07 620 
(1923), quoted in 2 GEORGE H. HAYNES, THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES: ITS 
HISTORY AND PRACTICE 1024 (Russell & Russell 1960). Modern methods are more civi-
lized; citizens have asserted their right to participate in government by directly legislating on 
issues ranging from affirmative action to local property taxation. See PETER SCHRAG, 
PARADISE LOST 9-10 (1998) (describing California's "condition of permanent neopopulism"). 
5. 514 u.s. 779 (1995). 
6. ld. at 783 (1995) (quoting Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 547 (1969)). 
7. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 126 (James Madison). 
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people, but by the peoples' representatives. Even most Republi-
cans in the Senate, that most deliberative of bodies by the Framers' 
design, insisted that President Clinton had betrayed the peoples' 
trust, although the people surely did not say as much. In essence, 
these senators substituted their factious inclinations for the public 
good. Hence the failed impeachment of President Clinton teaches 
that it is not the passions of the people, as Madison and others 
held, that is to be feared, but the partisanship and self-interest of 
the peoples' representatives in Congress. 
This is a lesson not lost on several states. Since the Progres-
sive Era, states have passed statutes or constitutional provisions 
that allow voters to remove or discharge their representatives in 
Congress by filing a petition bearing a specified number of 
signatures demanding a vote on the representative or senator's 
continued tenure in office.8 These "recall" statutes have been used 
effectively for many years to check state and local officials.9 Their 
efficacy with regard to members of Congress, however, remains an 
open question. Recall proceedings have from time to time been 
contemplated or initiated by disappointed constituents wishing to 
remove Members of Congress who have in the voters' view 
breached the public trust. However, efforts to force a recall have 
foundered amid speculation that the people of a state cannot 
8. Fifteen states provide for recall of elected state officials, and thirty-six states permit 
the recall of various local officials. See THOMAS E. CRONIN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY: THE 
POLmCS OF INffiATIVE, REFERENDUM, AND RECALL 126-27 (1989). Many of the state 
provisions arguably apply to Members of Congress, as they cover all elected officials, without 
specifically excluding Members of Congress. Some states leave no room for doubt; their 
recall measures specifically include Members of Congress. The following state provisions 
apply expressly to Members of Congress: LA. CONST. art. 10, § 26; N.D. CONST. art. 3, § 10; 
N.J. CONST. art. I, 'J. 2; WIS. CONST. art. 13, § 12; ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 19-221-222 
(West 1990); MICH. STAT. ANN.§ 6.1121 (Law. Co-op 1993); WIS. STAT. ANN.§ 9.10 (West 
1996). 
9. Adoption of the recall device in America usually is traced to the enactment of the 
Los Angeles city charter in 1903. For a description of the tide of adoption of recall measures 
during the Progressive era and beyond, see CRONIN, supra note 8, at 128-33. Although the 
idea of recall often is associated with the populists and progressives, in fact its historical roots 
run much deeper. Athenian democracy, for example, instituted the ostracism of politicians 
by majority vote to protect the polis from corrupt or overly ambitious officials. See id. at 
128. Officials could be banished from the city-state for ten years. See id. Prior to 1850, the 
Swiss provided for the recall of public officials by a method similar to the current state laws, 
although they rarely used the device. See id. at 129. 
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constitutionally recall a Member of Congress.10 The defeat of 
state term limits measures has likely hardened this view. 
In this Article, I argue that regardless of its constitutionality, 
recall is an important monitoring device that should be available to 
the people of a state who conclude that a United States Senator 
has breached the public trust and is unfit to represent his or her 
constituents in Congress. In Part II, I demonstrate that this is not 
such a radical idea-indeed, state recall of federal representatives 
has a rich constitutional history, including extensive debates waged 
in the state conventions concerning ratification of the Constitution. 
Part II concludes with a brief review of the modern state recall 
measures. In Part III, I criticize court decisions, including dicta in 
the Thornton majority and dissenting opinions, and scholarly 
commentary, that dismiss recall as an unconstitutional accountabili-
ty measure. I argue that whether recall is still available to the 
people after Thornton remains an open question. In Part IV, I 
conclude that, regardless of whether recall is constitutionally 
proscribed, there are compelling reasons for placing in the hands 
of the people through a constitutional amendment the power to 
recall their United States Senators. Indeed, I argue that this power 
is a component of the power to directly elect United States 
Senators, granted to the people by the Seventeenth Amendment. 
Finally, in Part V, I propose a somewhat cautious approach, 
borrowed from the experience with recall of state and local 
officials, to allowing the people of the states to recall their United 
States Senators. 
10. Voters in Oregon in 1992 considered instituting that state's statutorily prescribed 
recall proceedings against Senator Robert Packwood after allegations of sexual harassment 
surfaced. See Glenn R. Simpson, Senate Ethics Staff Launches a Preliminary Investigation 
of Packwood for Harassment, ROLL CALL, Dec. 3, 1992 [hereinafter Senate Ethics Staff]. 
Two Senators caught up in the so-called "Keating Five" scandal-John McCain (R-Ariz) and 
Dennis DeConcini (D-Ariz)-also were targets of a recall effort. See Glenn R. Simpson, 
Chances of Enforcing Packwood's Removal Are Remote, ROLL CALL, Dec. 7, 1992 
[hereinafter Chances of Enforcing]. A group opposing Chippewa Indian treaty rights began 
a recall campaign against Rep. David Obey (D-Wis). See Tim Curran, Clerk Says Members 
Cannot Be Recalled, ROLL CALL, May 21, 1990. 
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II. The History of State Recall 
A. The Articles of Confederation and the Philadelphia Conven-
tion 
Although it has received little scholarly attention, recall has a 
fertile constitutional history. The nation's first Constitution, 
adopted in 1777, provided that each state's delegates in the 
Continental Congress: 
[S]hall be annually appointed in such manner as the legislature 
of each state shall direct ... with a power reserved to each state 
to recall its delegates, or any of them, at any time within the year, 
and to send others in their stead for the remainder of the yearY 
This provision merely embodied the then-existing custom whereby 
each legislature retained control of the state's delegates in the 
Continental Congress.12 Though the power of recall was available 
to the states under the Confederation, there is no record of it 
having ever been exercised. 
There is virtually nothing in the surviving records of the 
Philadelphia Convention of 1787 relating to the power of recall. As 
the majority in Thornton pointed out in a footnote, Madison's notes 
reflect only that the Constitutional Convention failed to adopt the 
"Virginia Plan," which called for representation that would have 
favored the larger states, and which also incidentally contained, 
among other things, a constitutional provision for recall of members 
of the House of RepresentativesY Rejection of the Virginia Plan, 
however, did not settle the issue of recall. The central issue raised 
by the Virginia Plan was determining the representation in 
Congress, which was finally settled by the "New Jersey Plan" 
compromise to have a Senate allotted by states and a House 
allotted by population. The Virginia Plan was dropped in the 
Committee of the Whole without debate, and was set aside two 
days after its introduction by Edmund Randolph on May 29, 1787 
11. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, art. V (emphasis supplied). 
12. State legislatures regularly instructed the delegates to the Congress of the 
Confederation. The delegates considered such instructions binding. See 2 HAYNES, supra 
note 4, at 1025. 
13. See United States Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 810 n.20 (1995); see 
also 1M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 20,210, 217 
(rev. ed. 1966) [hereinafter FARRAND]. Apparently, the delegates did not even consider a 
right of recall of Senators. 
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because, among other reasons, it "entered too much into detail for 
general propositions."14 By the time, three months later, when the 
delegates took up the details of the legislative branch, the Virginia 
Plan was far in the past. 
B. The Federalist Papers and State Ratifying Conventions 
Most of the leaders during the Framers' era were profoundly 
skeptical of direct or pure democracy on a large scale. The 
Anglophile Alexander Hamilton, for example, initially favored a 
modified form of British monarchy and urged that Senators serve 
for life or at least during "good behavior."15 In his Federalist No. 
10, Madison set forth the classic statement of the filtering principle, 
under which public views would be "refine[d] and enlarge[d]" by 
"passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citi-
zens. "16 Even many Antifederalists believed that the frailties and 
passions of ordinary men made them incapable of responsible 
participation in government. Still, there were those Antifederalists 
who viewed a form of explicit representative democracy as vital. 
Representatives of the people, they thought, should be bound by 
the dictates of the governed. Thus, in order to devise a constitu-
tion that could win approval at state ratifying conventions and gain 
the acceptance of the public at large, the Framers ultimately 
embraced a somewhat watered down version of "consent of the 
governed," consisting of a lower House that would represent the 
passions of the people and a Senate intended to curb the anticipat-
ed excesses of democracy. 
1. The House of Representatives-That no one during the 
debates at Philadelphia or in the state conventions suggested that 
the people of the states should have the power to recall Members 
of the House of Representatives should come as no surprise. With 
respect to the House of Representatives, citizens were to express 
their consent through the representational device and, more 
specifically, through the mechanism of frequent elections. As the 
Framers conceived the House, its members would have "an 
14. 5 J. ELLIOT, DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION 
OF THE FEDERAL CONSTlTUTION 127, 137 (1836) (hereinafter ELLIOT'S DEBATES]. 
15. 1 HAYNES, supra note 4, at 16. 
16. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 126 (James Madison). Hamilton recommended that 
the national legislature should be composed only of "landholders, merchants, and men of the 
learned professions." THE FEDERALIST No. 35, at 234 (Alexander Hamilton). 
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immediate dependence on, and an intimate sympathy with, the 
people."17 The Framers apparently did not believe that weapons 
like the recall device would be necessary to maintain representa-
tives' accountability to their constituents. They considered it 
unlikely that, once elected, representatives "would either desire or 
dare, within the short space of two years, to betray the solemn trust 
committed to them."18 The Framers undoubtedly were aware that 
precautions were needed for "keeping [representatives] virtuous 
whilst they continue to hold their public trust."19 They left no 
doubt as to the most effectual method of ensuring the necessary 
dependence and responsibility: "Frequent elections," Madison 
asserted, "are unquestionably the only policy by which this 
dependence and sympathy can be effectually secured. "20 Thus 
biennial elections were "unalterably fixed" in the Constitution.21 
James Madison in The Federalist No. 57 explained how two-year 
terms would secure representatives' fidelity to their constituents. 
He wrote: 
[T]he House of Representatives is so constituted as to support 
in the members an habitual recollection of their dependence on 
the people. Before the sentiments impressed on their minds by 
the mode of their election can be effaced by the exercise of 
power, they will be compelled to anticipate the moment when 
their power is to cease, when their exercise of it is to be 
reviewed, and when they must descend to the level from which 
they were raised; there forever to remain unless a faithful 
discharge of their trust shall have established their title to a 
renewal of it.22 
Representatives' accountability was to be secured by their charac-
teristics, gratitude, duty, ambition, pride, and vanity. They could 
make no laws, Madison said, that would not have their full effect 
17. THE FEDERALIST No. 52, at 323-24 (James Madison). 
18. /d. No. 55, at 338; see also, e.g., id. No. 57, at 344 (James Madison) (stating that their 
characteristics "promise a sincere and scrupulous regard to the nature of their engage-
ments ... they will enter into the public service under circumstances which cannot fail to 
produce a temporary affection at least to their constituents."). 
19. /d. No. 57, at 343. 
20. /d. at 324 (emphasis supplied). 
21. See id. No. 53, at 328. Congress has passed legislation regulating the timing of 
elections for United States Senators and Representatives. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 1, 7; Busbee v. 
Smith, 594 F. Supp. 494, 525 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd 459 U.S. 1166 (1983) (mem.) (holding that 
"exigent circumstances" can justify different date and time for congressional election). 
22. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 17, No. 57, at 344-45 (James Madison). 
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on themselves.23 Madison ultimately acknowledged that these 
safeguards "may all be insufficient to control the caprice and 
wickedness of man."24 "But," he asked, "are they not all that 
government will admit, and that human prudence can devise?"25 
Madison even took pains to compare the new plan to the system in 
place under the Articles of Confederation. In contrasting the 
proposed House to the lower chamber in the Continental Congress, 
Madison noted that delegates to the latter body were "recallable at 
pleasure," but he made no similar claim as to the newly comprised 
House, hailing instead the brevity of House members' terms.26 
Recall of representatives was indeed far from the minds of Madison 
and the other architects of the lower chamber of Congress. 
2. The Debate Over State Recall of Senators-In contrast to 
the House, the composition of the Senate and the powers it was to 
exercise led many in the state conventions to vigorously argue for 
all manner of checks on its authority. When the Constitution was 
submitted for ratification by the states, many strongly urged that, 
in view of the senators' long terms, the power of recall ought to be 
given to the states.27 Several delegates complained to their state · 
conventions that one of the great defects of the proposed Constitu-
tion was its failure to provide for the recall of senators.28 Luther 
Martin, for example, in an address delivered to the Maryland 
legislature on November 29, 1787, expressed concern that senators 
would become "totally and absolutely independent of their 
States"29 during their six-year terms absent a provision-such as 
the one that existed in the Maryland Constitution at the 
time30 - allowing .for their recall. Martin warned lawmakers: 
During that time, they may join in measures ruinous and 
destructive to their States, even such as should totally annihilate 
23. See id. at 345. 
24. /d. 
25. /d. 
26. /d. 
27. See infra note 32. 
28. See infra note 32. 
29. 3 FARRAND, supra note 13, at 194. 
30. Maryland's first constitution provided that its delegates to federal congresses were 
subject to being "superseded in the meantime by the joint ballot of both Houses of 
Assembly." MD. CONST. art. 27 (1776). 
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their State governments, and their States cannot recall them, nor 
exercise any control over them.31 
575 
Martin's concerns were echoed in several other state conven-
tions.32 At Boston, for example, Dr. Taylor insisted on annual 
elections and the recall of senators by the state legislatures as 
under the Articles of Confederation.33 Three states ultimately 
proposed that the Constitution be amended to grant the state 
legislatures the power to recall senators.34 
a. Arguments Advanced in Favor of Recall of Senators- The 
. most robust debate concerning the recall of United States Senators 
occurred at the New York ratifying convention, where Gilbert 
Livingston offered an amendment granting the state legislatures the 
power to recall senators. Proponents of the amendment ultimately 
lost the issue, but managed in the process to engage Alexander 
Hamilton, among other Federalists, in a wide-ranging debate 
concerning the nature of the states' representation in the United 
States Senate. As I shall demonstrate in Part III, that two-
hundred-year-old debate might well be conducted on similar terms 
today. 
31. 3 FARRAND, supra note 13, at 194. 
32. See, e.g., 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 14, at 47 ("[S)enators chosen for so long 
a time will forget their duty to their constituents. We cannot ... recall them.") (statement 
of Colonel Jones of Massachusetts); id. at 48 ("[I)f they are once chosen, they are chosen 
forever ... in this [Constitution), they are to be chosen for six years; but a shadow of 
rotation provided for, and no power of recall.") (statement of Dr. Taylor of Massachusetts); 
id. at 477 ("[T)hey [Senators] are without that immediate degree of responsibility which I 
think requisite to make this part of the work perfect.") (statement of James Wilson of 
Pennsylvania); id. at 281 ("There are many material checks to the operation of [Congress), 
which the future Congress will not have . . . . They are subject to recall.") (statement of 
Melancton Smith of New York); 3 id. at 360 ("We cannot recall our senators.") (statement 
of Wilson Nicholas of Virginia). 
33. See 2 id. at 5. 
34. At a meeting in Harrisburg following the Pennsylvania convention, delegates recom-
mended an amendment providing for the recall of senators "at any time" by the legislatures 
that elected them. See id. at 330, 337. When Rhode Island finally ratified the Constitution 
in 1790, it also appended a proposed amendment providing for recall. See id. at 337. A 
similar amendment proposed by Gilbert Livingston in the New York convention was the 
subject of a lengthy debate. See infra pp. 9-19. While the representatives of these states 
were enjoined to exert their influence for these amendments in the First Congress, there is 
no record of any of them being presented to the Senate. This may be due to the fact that 
the Senate debates were not recorded during this period and also that the Senate Journal and 
the Annals of Congress do not show all of the details of Senate business. Still, the Senate 
Journal did record a number of constitutional amendments offered in the Senate, but none 
relating to recall. 
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Gilbert Livingston opened the debate on recall in New York 
by claiming that a recall amendment was needed to ensure that 
senators would retain their sense of responsibility to voters. 
Livingston's amendment provided: 
[N]o person shall be eligible as a Senator for more than six 
years in any term of twelve years, and that it shall be in the 
power of the legislatures of the several states to recall their 
Senators, or either of them, and to elect others in their stead, 
to serve for the remainder of the time for which such Senator 
or Senators, so recalled, were appointed?5 
In support of his proposed amendment, Livingston utilized rhetoric 
concerning the power of incumbency and congressional entrench-
ment that sounds arrestingly familiar to twentieth century ears. He 
labeled the Senate a "dangerous body"36 and asked his fellow 
delegates to consider: 
[T]he great influence which [the Senate], armed at all points, 
will have. What will be the effect of this? Probably a security 
of their reelection, as long as they please. Indeed, in my view, 
it will amount nearly to an appointment for life. 
In this Eden they will reside with their families, distant 
from the observation of the people. In such a situation, men 
are apt to forget their dependence, lose their sympathy, and 
contract selfish habits.37 
Supporters of Livingston's recall amendment were aware that 
the power of recall granted under the Articles of Confederation 
was never exercised. Still, they believed that recall would act as a 
valuable check on senators-what some contemporary scholars 
have referred to as "the gun behind the door."38 The intrepid 
Antifederalist John Lansing, for example, noted: 
[I]f [the power of recall] should be never exercised, if it should 
. have no other force than that of a check to the designs of the 
35. 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 14, at 289. 
36. /d. at 286. Livingston wondered: "[W]hat are the checks provided to balance this 
great mass of power? Our present Congress cannot serve longer than three years in six: they 
are subject at any time to recall." /d. at 287. 
37. /d. at 287-88. Livingston feared that senators would "become strangers to the 
condition of the common people" as they would "have little or no check on them." ld. at 
288. 
38. See, e.g., CRONIN, supra note 8, at 155. 
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bad ... certainly no harm, but much good, may result from 
adopting the amendment.39 
577 
Besides, Lansing noted, "[N]o inconvenience can follow from 
placing the powers of the Senate on such a foundation as to make 
[senators] feel their dependence."40 Recall of senators, Lansing 
believed, was "only a check calculated to make [senators] more 
attentive to the objects for which they were appointed. "41 In sum, 
Lansing and other supporters of Livingston's amendment believed 
that the prospect of recall under the Articles of Confederation had 
"operated effectually, though silently. "42 
Answering anticipated criticisms that granting states the power 
of recall would enslave senators to the electorate's every whim and 
deter qualified candidates, Lansing assured that in the first instance 
recall "is of so delicate a nature, that few men will step forward to 
move a recall, unless there is some strong ground for it."43 
Moreover, Livingston's supporters did not believe that the spectre 
of recall would inhibit virtuous men from becoming candidates for 
the Senate. The presence of recall under the Articles, Lansing 
argued, had "by no means proved a discouragement to individuals, 
in serving their country. "44 
According to Lansing and other Antifederalists, recall was the 
only means by which the states could exercise any control over 
their senators. These men worried that the States under the 
proposed Constitution would be denied even the essential power to 
compel the attendance of absent senators.45 Lansing pointedly 
noted the fundamental problem with depositing in the Senate itself 
39. 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 14, at 290. 
40. /d. 
41. /d. Delegates in New York, as in other state conventions, expressed considerable 
anxiety that the powers granted to the Senate to approve treaties, try impeachments, and 
confirm appointments would overrun the President. See id. at 309-11. Melancton Smith felt 
that the "inconvenience" of vesting in the Senate such broad powers "should be corrected, 
by providing some suitable checks," such as recall. /d. at 311. 
42. /d. at 294. Melancton Smith actually feared that "the power of recall would not be 
exercised as often as it ought." /d. at 312. Smith nevertheless agreed that usually the mere 
threat of action should suffice. See id. at 313 ("Checks in government ought to act silently, 
and without public commotion."). 
43. /d. at 290; see also id. at 314 ("It is not to be supposed that a state will recall a man 
once in twenty years, to make way for another."); id. at 312 ("It is highly improbable that 
a man in whom the state has confided, and who has an established influence, will be recalled, 
unless his conduct has been notoriously wicked."). 
44. 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 14, at 294. 
45. See id. at 290. 
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the sole responsibility for bringing the peoples' will to bear on a 
rogue senator: 
[Recall] is the only thing which can give the states a control 
over the Senate. It will be said, there is a power in Congress to 
compel the attendance of absent members; but will the mem-
bers from the other states be solicitous to compel such atten-
dance, except to answer some particular view, or promote some 
interest of their own?46 
Only the States, these men argued, could be trusted to police 
absence from the chamber or malfeasance while in office. 
Proponents of recall by state legislatures reasoned that since 
the Senate was designed to serve as a bulwark to the independence 
of the states and a check on the encroachments of the federal 
government, its members ought to be peculiarly under the 
legislatures' control. To these men, power to recall a senator who 
refused or neglected to corriply with the legislatures' wishes seemed 
to be a natural concomitance of this theory of the Senate.47 
Recall supporters complained that friends of the Constitution were 
inclined to use the concept of the Senate as representative of state 
sovereignty when it suited their purpose, and when it did not, to 
ignore it or to imply that attachment to state interests was an 
evil.48 Moreover, recall supporters accepted that in some instances 
the smaller interests of the states should be sacrificed to great 
national objects. But Lansing raised an important point: "[W]hen 
a delegate makes such sacrifices as tend to political destruction, or 
to reduce sovereignty to subordination," Lansing argued, "his state 
46. Id. Occasionally, concern over absenteeism rankled the state legislatures. In 1807, 
for example, the Ohio legislature requested that Senator Samuel Smith resign, declaring he 
had been guilty of great negligence in not attending to his duty in Washington. See HAYNES, 
supra note 4, at 1023-24. One of Smith's colleagues, in his diary, declared the charge was 
true, and co=ented: 
The proceeding of the Legislature is singular. And query, what can a State do, if 
a Senator neglects to attend? Perhaps the only remedy is for the Senate 
themselves, in such a case, to expel the member for breach of their rules in not 
attending their duty. 
See id. at 1024 (quoting PLUMER, supra note 4, at 620). 
47. See, e.g., 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 14, at 311 ("[A]s the senators are the 
representatives of the state legislatures, it is reasonable and proper that they should be under 
their control.") (statement of Melancton Smith). 
48. See, e.g., id. at 312 ("Sir, the Senate has been generally held up, by all parties, as a 
safeguard to the rights of the several states . . . . But now, it seems, we speak in a different 
language; we now look upon the least attachment to their states as dangerous."); see also id. 
at 289-91, 294. 
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ought to have the power of defeating his design, and reverting to 
the people."49 Whether an agent of the state, the Union, or both, 
Lansing and the Antifederalists did not want to create senators who 
were untouchable gods. 
b. Arguments Advanced Against Recall of Senators-Alex-
ander Hamilton was the most vocal opponent of granting the States 
power to recall their senators. Hamilton first questioned the 
necessity of the recall device: "[C]an we imagine," he asked, "that 
the senators will ever be so insensible of their own advantage as to 
sacrifice the genuine interest of their constituents?"50 Hamilton 
believed that the spectre of losing office by losing favor with the 
state legislatures constituted a sufficient check.51 
Perhaps recognizing that this appeal was not likely to sway 
many Antifederalists, Hamilton then turned to the primary 
argument advanced by opponents of recall of senators. The power 
to recall senators, Hamilton urged, would create chaos by "ren-
der[ing] the Senator a slave to all the capricious humors among the 
people."52 A senator subject to recall by the state legislatures 
would, Hamilton feared, "perpetually feel himself in such a state of 
vassalage and dependence, that he never can possess that firmness 
which is necessary to the discharge of his great duty to the 
Union."53 Chancellor Robert Livingston agreed. He contended 
that under the proposed recall amendment, "a senator may be 
appointed one day and recalled the next," leading to "a source of 
endless confusion."54 Robert Morris similarly objected that 
Livingston's amendment "would create a slavish subjection to the 
49. /d. at 295. 
50. /d. at 303-04; see also 3 id. at 97 ("I do not conceive they will so soon forget the 
source from whence they derive their political existence.") (statement of James Madison). 
51. See id. at 317-18 ("[T]he senators will constantly be attended with a reflection, that 
their future existence is absolutely in the power of the states. Will not this form a powerful 
check?") (statement of Alexander Hamilton). 
52. 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 14, at 302; see also, e.g., 1 id. at 361 ("The dread 
of being recalled would impair their independence and usefulness.") (statement of Wilson 
Nicholas). 
53. See 2 id. at 302-03; see also id. at 318-19 ("[T]o be dependent from day to day, and 
to have the idea perpetually present, would be the source of numerous evils.") (statement 
of Alexander Hamilton). There can be little doubt that the "evils" Hamilton prophesied 
stemmed in large measure from his fundamental distrust of the masses. See, e.g., 2 id. at 302 
("To deny that [the people] are frequently led into the grossest errors by misinformation and 
passion, would be a flattery which their own good sense must despise."); id. ("[T]hey do not 
possess the discernment and stability necessary for systematic government."). 
54. /d. at 291. 
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contracted views of and prevailing factions of the state govern-
ments,"55 and, in a flash of the rhetoric that sometimes crept into 
the debate on this and other issues, even expressed the fear that 
recall might be so distracting to senators as to expose the nation 
"an easy prey to its enemies."56 
Hamilton acknowledged the people's "zeal for liberty" and 
acknowledged that the object sought by supporters of recall was a 
valuable one,57 but ultimately rested his opposition to Livingston's 
amendment on the need for "strength and stability in the organiza-
tion of our government, and vigor in its operations. "58 Hamilton 
insisted that the effect of a state's recall of its senators would be to 
take away the stability of government by depriving the Senate of 
its permanency and "by assimilating the complexion of the two 
branches to destroy the balance between them. "59 Only the 
House was to be "immediately constituted by and peculiarly 
represent the people."60 The Senate, Hamilton explained at the 
New York convention, was to provide the "balance" and "control" 
necessary to efficient government.61 Stability, Madison reasoned, 
surely would be compromised by a "numerous and changeable 
body"; security would be attainable only where the assembly is 
"durably invested with public trust. "62 Fixed terms of consider-
able duration were considered by Hamilton, Madison, and other 
Framers as essential to the success of the Senate and, indeed, the 
entire republic. 
Hamilton's admonitions concerning the need for stability were 
repeatedly underscored by James Madison in a series of essays in 
The Federalist Papers. Hamilton and other Federalists were 
55. Id. at 297. Lansing noted that the recall power had never been exercised under the 
Articles, and countered that "as far ... as experience is satisfactory, we may safely conclude 
that none of these factious humors will operate to produce the evils which the gentlemen 
apprehend." ld. at 299. 
56. Id. at 297. 
57. See 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 14, at 301. 
58. I d. (emphasis in original). 
59. ld. at 303, 316 ("[T]he reasoning which justly applies to the representative house, 
will go to destroy the essential qualities of the Senate."). 
60. ld. at 302. 
61. ld. Several delegates in Philadelphia expressed the same sentiment, calling for a 
"firmness" in the Senate. See, e.g., 1 FARRAND, supra note 13, at 415 ("This body must act 
with firmness.") (statement of Governor Randolph); id. at 414 ("In the second branch of the 
general government we want wisdom and firmness.") (statement of Oliver Ellsworth). 
62. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 17, No. 63, at 369 (James Madison) (emphasis 
supplied). 
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convinced that the aristocratic elements in society must play a vital 
role in countering the popular storms and passions of ordinary 
people. As Madison explained, the Senate was designed as a check 
on the 
propensity of all single and numerous assemblies to yield to the 
impulse of sudden and violent passions, and to be seduced by 
factious leaders into intemperate and pernicious resolutions.63 
Further, Madison wrote: 
[T]here are particular moments in public affairs when the 
people, stimulated by some irregular passion, or some illicit 
advantage, or misled by the artful misrepresentations of 
interested men, may call for measures which they themselves 
will afterwards be the most ready to lament and condemn.64 
The Senate in such a situation was to act as a "defence to the 
people against their own temporary errors and delusions," an 
"anchor against popular fluctuations"; its role was to"suspend the 
blow meditated by the people against themselves, until reason, 
justice, and truth can regain their authority over the public 
mind."65 James Iredell put the Federalist consensus plainly at the 
North Carolina ratifying convention: "[T]the Senate," he said, 
"should not be at the mercy of every popular clamor."66 
The desire of Hamilton and Madison for "some stable 
institution in the government"67 greatly influenced the shape that 
section three of the First Article of the Constitution would 
ultimately take. Considerable duration of terms was necessary, but 
not sufficient, to guarantee the Senate's great firmness. The 
Framers felt also the need to separate the rulers in the Senate from 
the ruled. To accomplish this result, they decided to place the 
63. ld. No. 62, at 366. 
64. /d. No. 63, at 371. 
65. Id.; see also 1 FARRAND, supra note 13, at 151 ("The use of the Senate is to consist 
in its proceeding with more coolness, with more system, and with more wisdom, than the 
popular branch.") (statement of James Madison). The Framers had read about the rise and 
decline of Athens and other ancient city-states that preached and practiced direct democracy, 
and they accepted the widely held view that the follies of such kinds of democracy easily out-
weighed their virtue. "What bitter anguish," Madison mused, "would not the people of 
Athens have often escaped if their government had contained so provident a safeguard 
against the tyranny of their own passions?" THE FEDERALIST, supra note 17, No. 63, at 371 
(James Madison). 
66. 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 14, at 40. 
67. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 17, No. 62, at 368 (James Madison). 
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power to choose who should sit in the Senate-a matter of great 
controversy and countless proposals at the Philadelphia Conven-
tion- not with the voters at large but rather with the more prudent 
and virtuous state legislatures. A large proportion of the delegates 
to the state conventions were or had been members of state legisla-
tures themselves and considered themselves well qualified to 
choose their states' senators. The state legislatures, most believed, 
would serve as a filtering mechanism to screen popular passions 
and ensure the election of virtuous senators. 
For Livingston, Hamilton, and many others at the time of the 
framing, nothing was considered more ominous than the machina-
tions of parties or "factions." The state legislatures were consid-
ered stable ·bodies, fortresses against odious factions. Many feared 
that giving these bodies the power to recall senators would 
strengthen the hand of factions and introduce improper consider-
ations into the selection process.68 Chancellor Livingston, for 
example, feared that factions might seek to use the recall to ruin a 
man of "incorruptible integrity" for partisan gain.69 Livingston 
feared that if a Senator "deviated, in the least degree, from the line 
which a prevailing party in a popular assembly had marked for him, 
he would be immediately recalled."70 "How easy would it be," 
Livingston fretted, "for an ambitious, factious demagogue to 
misrepresent him, to distort the features of his character, and give 
a false color to his conduct! How easy for such a man to impose 
upon the public, and influence them to recall and disgrace their 
faithful delegate!"71 Hamilton also feared that the influence of 
factions on the representatives in the state legislatures would cause 
them to be"governed by improper passions.'m Hamilton noted 
that "[i]f the members of Congress are too dependent on the state 
legislatures, they will be eternally forming secret combinations from 
local views.'m 
68. 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 14, at 291 ("The state legislatures, being frequently 
subject to factions and irregular passions, may be unjustly disaffected and discontented with 
their delegates .... ") (statement of Robert Livingston). 
69. /d. at 292. 
70. /d. 
71. /d.; see also id. ("There are a thousand things which an honest man might be obliged 
to do, from a conviction that it would be for the general good, which would give great 
dissatisfaction to his constituents."). 
72. !d. at 317. 
73. 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 14, at 318. Hamilton posed a hypothetical salt tax 
that he asserted would undoubtedly be opposed by the Eastern States. "Would it be wise," 
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Federalists rejected the argument of the Antifederalists that 
the Senate, thus removed from the people, would become a 
tyrannical aristocracy. Various obstructions were placed in 
Senators' paths to combat this danger. To become so corrupted, 
Madison explained, the ,Senate 
must in the first place corrupt itself; must next corrupt the State 
legislatures; must then corrupt the House of Representatives; 
and must finally corrupt the people at large.74 
The Federalist stalwart Rufus King believed that the state legisla-
tures did not need the recall power, as they retained the "powerful 
check" of instructing their senators-telling them how to 
vote-should they misbehave.75 Besides, Hamilton added, the 
constant rotation of the Senate's membership would impose a 
"lively sense of their dependence" on members whose office is near 
the point of expiration.76 Hamilton and other Federalists believed 
that this would be a sufficient guarantee of senators' dependence 
on the States.77 
Federalists in New York also based their opposition to 
Livingston's recall proposal on the distinction they drew between 
state and federal officers. Hamilton did not accept the Antifederal-
ist assertion that senators were mere agents of the state legislatures. 
He argued: 
That a man should have power in private life of recalling his 
agent is proper, because in the business in which he is engaged 
he has no other object but to gain the approbation of his 
principal. Is this the case with the Senator? Is he simply the 
agent of the State? No. He is an agent for the Union, and he 
Hamilton asked, "to give the New England States a power to defeat this measure, by 
recalling their senators who may be engaged for it?" !d. 
74. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 17, No. 63, at 373 (James Madison). 
75. See 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 14, at 47; see also id. ("When they hear the 
voice of the people solemnly dictating to them their duty, they will be bold men indeed to 
act contrary to it.") (statement of Rufus King). On the practice of instruction of senators, 
see infra notes 146-148 and accompanying text. 
76. See 2 id. at 319. 
77. John Jay in THE FEDERALIST No. 64 considered the possibility that the Senate might 
act corruptly in exercis4J_g its treaty power. He rejected the idea that the President and two-
thirds of the Senate would be capable of such conduct as "too gross and too invidious to be 
entertained." !d. at 379. Nevertheless, Jay reasoned that the "motive to good behavior is 
amply afforded by the article on the subject of impeachment." !d. Impeachment is an 
answer to presidential misconduct, but precedent indicates that senators cannot be 
impeached. See infra note 145. 
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is bound to perform services necessary to the good of the 
whole, though his State should condemn them.78 
Others shared Hamilton's view of the nature of federal representa-
tion. Robert Livingston, for example, noted: 
[S]ometimes it happens that small sacrifices are absolutely 
dispensable for the good and safety of the confederacy; but, if 
a senator should presume to consent to these sacrifices, he 
would be immediately recalled . . . . The general government 
may find it necessary to do many things which some states 
might never be willing to consent to.79 
Hamilton's position could not have been clearer. In his view, 
"[T]he local interests of a state ought, in every case, to give way to 
the interests of the Union .... "80 
A few opponents of Livingston's recall amendment feared that 
the states by exercising the recall power could effectively "annihi-
late the government" by recalling members and failing to elect 
anyone in their place.81 Once again, Lansing forcefully answered 
the criticism, referring to the experience under the Articles of 
Confederation and denouncing such a projection as not reasoning 
upon probability.82 In any event, Lansing added, he had "no 
objection that a clause should be added to the amendment, obliging 
the state, in case of a recall, to choose immediately other senators 
to fill the vacancy. "83 
Finally, Hamilton and opponents of recall were not satisfied 
that the absence of abuse of the recall device under the Articles of 
Confederation proved the merits of Livingston's amendment. "The 
experience of a few years, under peculiar circumstances," Hamilton 
said, "can afford no probable security that it never will be carried 
into execution with unhappy effects."84 A seat in the United 
States Senate, Hamilton darkly suggested, had been "less an object 
of ambition" under the Articles, and "the arts of intrigue, conse-
quently, have been less practiced."85 All was about to change with 
the creation of a more powerful Congress. 
78. 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 14, at 319-20. 
79. /d. at 291-92. 
80. !d. at 303. 
81. See id. at 299. 
82. See id. 
83. 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 14, at 300. 
84. /d. at 306. 
85. /d. 
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Despite Federalist objections, Livingston's amendment was 
finally adopted as one of the amendments for which New York's 
representatives in the First Congress were solemnly enjoined to 
exert all their influence. It does not appear, however, that the 
Senate ever took up this or any of the other proposed recall 
amendments.86 Rejection of recall measures in the First Congress 
did not end the debate over recall of federal legislators. For many 
years resolutions proposing recall amendments were frequently 
introduced in Congress, often following public scandals.87 None, 
however, ever received significant support. 
c. The Locus of State Power-One additional observation 
should be made concerning the state debates on recall. None of 
the delegates advocated placing the power of recall in the people, 
as do current state recall laws. Since the decision had been made 
to grant the state legislatures the power to select senators, there 
was no reason to debate the propriety of placing in the people 
directly the power of removal. A few delegates did point out the 
difficulties in vesting in the voters themselves the power of recall. 
John Lansing, for example, asserted that placing the power directly 
in the hands of the people was "impracticable," as (in that age) 
"[t]here [was] no regular way of collecting the people's senti-
ments."88 Perhaps better capturing the sense of the delegates was 
Melancton Smith, who argued that only the state legislatures would 
be competent to exercise the recall power. They did not suffer 
from the "impulses of the multitude" and, unlike the people at 
large, would not be "incompetent to deliberate discussion, and 
subject to errors and imprudences. "89 
C. Early State Laws 
While Congress failed to pass a recall provision, states began 
to experiment on their own after 1900 with provisions that became 
the ancestors· of the modern recall measures. The people of 
Oregon, for example, by initiative in 1908 adopted a constitutional 
provision under which " [ e ]very public officer . . . is subject, as 
86. See supra note 34. 
87. For example, "such a resolution was immediately introduced in the House of Repre-
sentatives, upon the announcement of the verdict in the Chase impeachment trial, March 1, 
1805." 2 HAYNES, supra note 4, at 1024 n.l. 
88. 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 14, at 294. 
89. /d. at 312. 
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herein provided, to recall by the legal voters of the state or of the 
electoral district from which he is elected."90 North Dakota in 
1920 passed an Act providing a recall procedure applicable to "any 
elective congressional, state, county, judicial or legislative offi-
cer."91 The Arizona "Advisory Recall" statute, enacted in 1913, 
provided that any candidate for a seat in the United States Senate 
may file with his nomination petition his signature to "Statement 
No. 1 ": "If elected to the office of United States Senator, I shall 
deem myself responsible to the people, and under obligation to 
them to resign immediately, if so requested by an advisory vote."92 
A candidate also could sign "Statement No. 2," declaring that the 
candidate would not be under an obligation to resign. The 
Secretary of State was instructed to place under each candidate's 
name on the ballot: "Pledged to Advisory Recall," or "Refuses 
Pledge to Advisory Recall," or "Silent as to Advisory Recall."93 
D. Modern State Recall Laws 
Existing state recall measures grew out of the early state 
experimentation. While the recall measures are by no means 
uniform, there are many similarities.94 State recall laws usually 
are one-shot provisions-electors are limited to filing one recall 
petition and having one recall election against an official during the 
term for which he or she was elected.95 Electors may petition for 
the recall of an official by filing a petition bearing a specified 
90. OREGON CONST. art. II, § 18. 
91. "In the debate over the Nye election case in January, 1926, this Act was repeatedly 
cited as evidence that the North Dakota legislature considered their Senators to be state as 
well as federal officers." 2 HAYNES, supra note 4, at 1025 n.2. 
92. Arizona Civil Code, 1913, ch. III, §§ 3357-64. 
93. 2 HAYNES, supra note 4, at 1025. 
94. For an excellent description of state recall measures, see Elizabeth E. Mack, The Use 
and Abuse of Recall: A Prop.osal for Legislative Recall Reform, 67 NEB. L. REV. 617, 625-29 
(1988). 
95. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 9.10(6) (West 1996); see also MICH. STAT. ANN. § 6.1969 
(Law. Co-op 1993) (providing for further recall elections when petitioners pay expenses). 
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number of valid signatures96 demanding a vote on the official's 
continued tenure in office.97 
State laws vary as to requirements concerning the proper 
grounds for recall. Some provisions place no restrictions whatever 
on the reason for recall; some provisions require a brief but clear 
statement of the reason for recall and further require that the 
reason be based on acts or conduct of the official while in office; 
still other provisions strictly define the permissible grounds for 
recall.98 Michigan's law, for example, requires that the petition 
"[s]tate clearly each reason for the recall," which must be "based 
upon the officer's conduct during his or her current term of office," 
and stated in not more than 200 words.99 In contrast, under 
Wisconsin's recall statute, Members of Congress may be recalled 
for any reason at all.100 
If a petition meets all of the necessary requirements, a recall 
election is held. The incumbent continues to perform the duties of 
office until the election results are officially determined. If the 
recall is successful, a special election is held within sixty days for 
the filling of the vacancy.101 
III. The Scholarly Consensus and the Thorton Opinions 
Only two courts have ever confronted the issue of state recall 
of Members of Congress. An Idaho state court in an unreported 
memorandum decision interpreted Idaho's recall statute to apply 
only to state officers, and further opined that the law was unconsti-
tutional as applied to United States Senators because it would 
constitute a "qualification" for office in addition to age, residency, 
and inhabitancy in violation of Article I, Section 3 of the United 
96. Signature requirements under the state laws vary. Most recall laws require that at 
least 25% of the voters petition for a recall election. See, e.g., MICH. CONST. art. 2, § 8 
(requiring 25% of the number of persons voting in the preceding election for the office of 
governor in the electoral district the incumbent represents); WIS. CON ST. art. 13, § 12(1) 
(providing the same requirement as the Michigan Constitution). 
97. There are various requirements as to the form of the petitions, including the size and 
type of print, requirements as to certificates of petition circulators, and filing of registration 
statements. See, e.g., MICH. STAT. ANN. § 6.1952; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 9.10(2). 
98. See Mack, supra note 94, at 625-32. 
99. MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 6.1952(1)(c), 6.1966. 
100. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 9.10(3). 
101. See, e.g., MICH. STAT. ANN. § 6.1971. The official who is recalled cannot be a 
candidate in the special election. See id. § 6.174. If an official resigns either subsequent to 
the filing of petitions or after the calling of the recall election, the election does not proceed. 
See id. 
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States Constitution.102 In the only other court challenge, a federal 
district court in Michigan dismissed a complaint seeking a declara-
tory judgment that United States Senators from Michigan were 
subject to recall under that state's recall law on the grounds that no 
Article III controversy had been pleaded.103 The few scholars 
who have addressed the subject have generally adopted the 
reasoning of the Idaho court.104 
The Idaho court's dicta and the scholarly opinion, which treat 
recall as an unconstitutional "qualification," ignore the crucial 
distinction the Framers made between the power to expel and the 
power to exclude Members of Congress. Exclusion of a member by 
qualification results in a candidate being refused a seat based upon 
the candidate's failure to meet the stated qualification.105 
Nothing in any state recall statute, however, prohibits a person 
from being elected and seated, so long as the candidate meets the 
age, residency, and inhabitancy "qualifications" set forth in Article 
I. A recall election operates only after a seat is occupied-it is in 
the nature of an expulsion from office, not an additional "qualifica-
tion" for office.106 
In United States Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 107 both the 
majority and the dissenters hinted, but did not hold, that the people 
of a state cannot constitutionally recall a Member of Congress. As 
noted above, the majority pointed out in a footnote that Madison's 
102. Rankin v. Cenarrusa, Civil No. 39700 (District Court for the Fourth Judicial District 
of Idaho) (Oct. 9, 1967). The United States Constitution provides: 
No Person shall be a Senator who shall not have attained the to the Age of thirty 
Years, and been nine Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, 
when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State for which he shall be chosen. 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 3. 
103. See Hooper v. Hart, 56 F.R.D. 476, 477 (W.D. Mich. 1972) (per curiam). 
104. See Simpson, Chances of Enforcing, supra note 10 ("Most legal scholars believe that 
U.S. Senators and Representatives, as federal officers, may not be recalled ... the chances 
of the Oregon [recall] law being upheld are considered slim."); see also JOSEPH P. 
ZIMMERMAN, PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY 108 n.21 (1986) (noting that State provisions 
may violate United States Constitution); Senate Election Law Guidebook, S. Doc. No. 103-
13, at 336-37 (1994) ("[M]aking a United States Senator or United States Representative 
subject to removal by a state recall election would constitute an additional qualification for 
office which the states do not have the constitutional authority to enact."). 
105. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 508 (1969). 
106. For a discussion of the distinction between exclusion and expulsion, see Gerald T. 
McLaughlin, Congressional Self-Discipline: The Power to Expel, To Exclude and To Punish, 
41 FORDHAM L. REv. 43, 45 (1972); see also Note, The Power of a House of Congress to 
Judge the Qualifications of Its Members, 81 HARV. L. REV. 673, 675-76 (1968). 
107. 514 u.s. 779 (1995). 
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notes reflect that the Constitutional Convention failed to adopt the 
"Virginia Plan," which contained, among many other things, a 
constitutional provision allowing the states to recall United States 
Senators.108 As the state ratifying conventions demonstrated, 
however, rejection of ~he Virginia Plan hardly demonstrated a 
consensus on the issue of recall. 
More troubling for supporters of state recall is the Court's 
general approach to state power. The Thornton majority searched 
the Constitution for some provision granting to the states the 
power to limit the terms of senators and representatives.109 
Finding no such express grant of state power, the Court held that 
the Constitution prohibits states from limiting the terms of their 
federal representatives and senators. But the Constitution does not 
require an affirmative grant of power to the states. Unlike the 
Federal Government, which enjoys no authority beyond that 
conferred by the Constitution, the states and the people of each 
individual state may exercise all powers that the Constitution does 
not withhold from themY0 If the Constitution is silent on a 
question, it does not bar action by the states or the people. As the 
Constitution does not bar the people of the states the power to 
recall their federal legislators, they should be free to exercise that 
power. If the Court continues to analyze state power as it did in 
Thornton, however, states would not have the power to conduct a 
recall election, as nothing in the Constitution grants them that 
power. 
The dissenters in Thornton, in concluding that the people of 
the states have the power to limit the terms of their federal 
legislators, correctly applied the fundamental rule that "[u]nless the 
Federal Constitution affirmatively prohibits an action by the States 
or the people, it raises no bar to such action. "111 Curiously, 
however, they too hinted that the people of the states cannot recall 
a Member of Congress. The dissenters at various points comment-
ed that states were denied the recall power because (1) Article I 
specifies fixed terms of office for representatives and senators; (2) 
once elected, members are part of a national body insulated from 
108. See id. at 810 n.20. 
109. See id. at 798-827. 
110. The Tenth Amendment provides: "The powers not delegated to the United States 
by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, 
or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
111. Thorton, 514 U.S. at 853 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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state control; and (3) the Framers granted the power to determine 
the salaries of congressmen to the federal government rather than 
to the states.112 
The dissenters do not get very far by simply reciting the text 
of Article I. As noted, the dissenters' conclusion that state term 
limits laws were constitutional rested heavily upon the fundamental 
principle that only an affirmative prohibition bars state power. ·'' 
There is nothing in the Constitution's text that expressly prohibits 
the states from exercising the recall power. The slating of terms at 
two years for representatives and six years for senators is not an 
affirmative prohibition of state power. The dissenters acknowl-
edged Chief Justice Marshall's admonition that when the Framers 
intended to withdraw power from the states, they knew how to say 
so unambiguously.113 And they stressed a "reluctance to read 
constitutional provisions to preclude state power by negative 
implication."114 If they were to be true to these principles, the 
dissenters could not conclude that the Constitution prohibits the 
states from exercising the power of recall.115 
Nor did the dissenters offer any support for the new rule of 
constitutional jurisprudence that "once the representatives chosen 
by the people of each State assemble in Congress, they form a 
national body and are beyond the control of the individual states 
until the next election."116 During the lengthy debates concerning 
proposals to allow the states to recall United States Senators, no 
one ever posited that members, once elected, would be insulated 
from all state control. Certainly the early practice of state 
"instruction" of United States Senators,117 under which the state 
112. See id. at 858, 882, 890. · 
113. See, e.g., U.S. CONST., art. I,§ 10; see also Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 
249 (1833) (When the Constitution has prohibitions, "[t]he question of their application to 
the states is not left to construction. It is averred in positive words."). 
114. Thorton, 514 U.S. at 870 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
115. The dissenters did not include in their dicta any argument that the power granted 
to each House to expel its members by two-thirds vote, see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2, 
somehow acts an affirmative prohibition on state power. Under the usual rules of 
constitutional interpretation, the granting of the power to expel removes any doubt as to the 
Federal Government's authority to cut short the term of a Member of Congress. But that 
grant of power does not necessarily remove any state power to act when Congress fails to 
do so. 
116. Thorton, 514 U.S. at 858 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
117. During the second quarter of the nineteenth century, some state legislatures required 
that a state's United States Senators vote on an issue in accordance with the state 
legislature's majority view. This practice came to be known as "instruction" of Senators. 
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legislatures dictated to Senators the positions they should take with 
regard to various matters, as well as the early state recall measures, 
argue against the dissenting justices' view. Moreover, if the 
Framers had intended such a radical insulation of senators and 
representatives, they could easily have provided for it in the 
Constitution itself by affirmatively denying the states the power to 
interrupt the terms of members-or, for that matter, from exercis-
ing any other control over members who have been elected and 
seated. 
The payment of the salaries of federal representatives was a 
matter of great concern to the Philadelphia delegates. Certainly, 
urged James Madison, congressmen were not to be paid by the 
states, whose parsimony toward their local legislators was notorious. 
During debate, Madison referred to the "great inconveniences 
experienced under the old Confederation."118 When Oliver 
Ellsworth moved to insert a provision in the Constitution providing 
that the states would pay their senators' salaries,119 Madison 
objected that if the motion should be agreed to, senators would 
"hold their places during pleasure; during the pleasure of the State 
Legislatures,"120 thus subverting the end intended by allowing the 
Senate a duration of six years. Madison did not believe that "one 
government should be dependent on another."121 History shows, 
however, that there were no similar "great inconveniences" with 
respect to the exercise of recall under the Articles of Confedera-
tion-the power in fact was never exercised. As for Madison's fear 
that one government might be dependent upon another, that 
concern is not at all implicated by state laws leaving to the people 
the decision whether to remove a senator or representative. The 
decision on salaries is slender evidence indeed upon which to rest 
the conclusion that the Framers denied the people of the states the 
power of recall. 
IV. The Case for Recall of U.S. Senators 
Particularly in light of the Thornton Court's analysis of state 
powers and the dissenters' rule insulating Members from state 
Some Senators were forced to resign when they disobeyed instructions. See infra notes 146-
148 and accompanying text. 
118. 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 14, at 369. 
119. See 1 FARRAND, supra note 13, at 427. 
120. /d. 
121. 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 14, at 369 (emphasis supplied). 
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control once seated in the national legislature, it is probable that 
the Court would hold that the states or the people lack power 
under the Constitution to recall a Member of Congress. Without 
such power, however, voters have little recourse to take their 
government back from incompetent or corrupt federal legislators, 
particularly United States Senators.122 There continues to be 
substantial support for the idea of controlling federal legislators 
through recall. In the most recent survey on the subject, conducted 
in 1987 for Thomas Cronin's book Direct Democracy, sixty-seven 
percent of respondents favored a constitutional amendment 
providing for the recall of senators and representatives by vote of 
the people of a state.123 One scholar has issued a call for such an 
amendment along with an exhaustive laundry list of other proposed 
constitutional amendments, but no careful analysis of such a 
proposal has yet been undertaken.124 
Placing in the people of the several states the power to remove 
their United States Senators would serve at least three vital 
purposes. First, allowing the people of the states to recall senators 
would fill the many gaps in the Senate's exercise of its power to 
expel. The Senate historically has interpreted its power to expel 
members narrowly. It seems clear, for example, that a senator 
cannot be expelled for conduct that occurred prior to being seated 
or for mere acts of "nonfeasance," such as failing to attend to 
official duties.125 Nor does it appear that a senator can be ex-
pelled for any actions not taken as part of his or her official 
duties.U6 The recall device would provide a means to fill the 
122. As did the Framers, I conclude that recall is both unnecessary and unworkable for 
the House of Representatives. There is no pressing need for recall when Representatives 
are by constitutional design sensitive to their constituents' needs and opinions, and when 
those who breach the public trust can be turned out of office with such exceptional dispatch. 
There is also the practical matter of time. Madison feared that annual elections might be an 
encouragement to unlawful means of obtaining office, since an irregular election "cannot be 
annulled in time for the decision to have its due effect." See THE FEDERALIST No. 57, at 
330. The same is true for a recall election- by the time all of the petition requirements are 
met and an election is held, a representative's term will in all likelihood have ended. 
123. See CRONIN, supra note 8, at 132. 
124 . . See generally CHESTER J. ANTIEAU, A U.S. CONSTITUTION FOR THE YEAR 2000 
(1995); see also id. at 159-62 (proposing recall amendment). 
125. See Note, supra note 106, at 682. 
126. See McLaughlin, supra note 106, at 49-50. McLaughlin argues that as expulsion was 
"doubtlessly intended to be" equivalent to impeachment, the grounds for impeachment offer 
some guidance as to the substantive limits on Congress's power to expel. /d. at 49. See U.S. 
CONST. art. II, § 4 (pr~widing that "[t]he President, Vice President and all civil officers of the 
United States, shall be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, treason, 
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gaps in the power of the Senate to expel its members for serious 
misconduct (official as well as unofficial), malfeasance, and even 
nonfeasance. 
Second, by filling these gaps in the senatorial expulsion power, 
state recall would encourage accountability and responsibility by 
senators in all of their conduct, whether official, unofficial, pre-
election, or post-election. I use the term "responsibility" in this 
context not to refer to a senator's responsiveness to voters' 
opinions on the myriad issues a senator must address while serving. 
While there is certainly no shortage of incumbent arrogance, day-
to-day attentiveness is not where the true difficulty lies. The 
primary goal of senatorial recall should not be to shackle senators 
to local or special interests, but rather to enable voters to remove 
a senator who acts reprehensibly, but whose conduct falls short of 
felony or treason, or to give voters the power to challenge a 
senator based on misconduct that occurred prior to the current 
term but only recently came to light. 
Third, granting the people the power to recall United States 
Senators would ensure that it is the people who truly choose whom 
will govern them. As John Lansing said in New York: when a 
senator "makes such sacrifices as tend to political destruction, or to 
reduce sovereignty to subordination, his state ought to have the 
power of defeating his design, and reverting to the people."127 
Or, as Professor Antieau put the case for popular sovereignty: 
To make the people of a state suffer for five more years a 
senator who in his first year in office has proved to their 
satisfaction that he is unable to represent them, denies the very 
first premise of our democratic form of government-that all 
political power is forever in the people.128 
Recall is a vital component of the right of the voters to exercise 
direct control over their United States Senators, a right the states 
had exercised through informal "instruction" of senators early in 
the nation's history, and a right the people of the states have 
exercised formally since the ratification of the Seventeenth 
Amendment in 1913. 
bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors"). As the impeachment proceedings against 
President Clinton demonstrated, the meaning of "high crimes and misdemeanors" is far from 
settled. 
127. 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 14, at 295. 
128. ANTIEAU, supra note 124, at 160. 
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A. The Power to Expel 
When considering the merits of senatorial recall, the first place 
to look is at the system the Framers themselves devised for 
addressing the problem of rogue senators. Each House of Congress 
has the power under the Constitution to expel its members on two-
thirds vote.129 More than two-hundred years has passed since the 
Framers granted the Senate the power to expel its members. Yet 
that power has been interpreted and exercised sparingly, despite 
continuing transgressions by senators in the exercise of both their 
official and unofficial duties.130 
It is instructive to observe under what circumstances the 
Senate has exercised the power of expulsion. As in the House, in 
which only two members have been expelled, 131 such a course has 
been exceedingly rare in the Senate. In the course of the nation's 
history, expulsion has been threatened or applied only in cases of 
treason and felony convictions. Of the twenty-three cases in which 
senators were actually expelled, all involved charges of treason or 
disloyalty, and all but one dealt with senators who sided with the 
Confederacy in the Civil War.132 Ten other senators, although 
not expelled, have been the subject of senatorial expulsion 
129. See U.S. CONST., art. I, § 5, cl. 2. 
130. In the contemporary Senate, there have been scandals ranging from poor ethical 
judgment to doubtful institutional practices. In 1986, five senators allegedly gave preferential 
treatment to major campaign contributor and subsequent felon Charles H. Keating, Jr. 
Another senator, Brock Adams (D-Wash), was accused of sexual improprieties and declined 
to run for reelection in 1992. Bob Packwood suffered a similar fate in 1995. Yet another 
senator, Dave Durenberger (R-Minn), claimed questionable reimbursements. 
131. Though expulsion has been threatened on many occasions, only two House members 
have ever been expelled-both on the ground of treason. They were: John W. Reid of 
Missouri and Henry C. Burnett of Kentucky (1861). See 2 ASHER C. HINDS, PRECEDENTS 
OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES§§ 1261!1262 (1907). 
132. Twenty-two of the twenty-three cases occurred during the Civil War. They were: 
Jefferson Davis, Albert G. Brown, Stephen R. Mallory, David L. Yulee, Clement C. Clay, 
Benjamin Fitzpatrick, Robert Toombs, and Judah P. Benjamin (1861), see Senate Election, 
Expulsion and Censure Cases from 1789-1960, SEN. Doc. No. 98-71, at 27 (1962) [hereinafter 
Senate Cases]; James M. Mason, Robert M.T. Hunter, Thomas L. Clingman, Thomas Bragg, 
James Chestnut, Jr., A.O.P. Nicholson, William K. Sebastian, Charles C. Mitchel, John 
Hemphill, and Louis T. Wigfall (1861), id. at 28; John C. Breckenridge (1861), id. at 29; Jesse 
D. Bright (1862), id. at 30; Waldo P. Johnson (1862), id.; Trusten Polk (1862), id. at 31. In 
1877 the Senate annulled the expulsion of William K. Sebastian. See 2 HINDS, supra note 
131, § 1243. There is some question whether Senators Davis, Brown, Mallory, Yulee, Clay, 
Fitzpatrick, Toombs and Benjamin were technically expelled. See Senate Cases, at 27. 
William Blount of Tennessee was expelled in 1797. See id. at 3. For a discussion of these 
cases, see 1 HAYNES, supra note 4, at 189-99. 
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proceedings: four for suspected treason or disloyalty; five for 
allegedly accepting bribes or receiving compensation for services 
rendered before a department of the Government; and one for his 
alleged membership in a "religious hierarchy that countenanced 
and encouraged polygamy and united church and state contrary to 
the spirit of the constitution .... "133 The most recent senators 
to face the threat of expulsion were Senator Harrison Williams of 
New Jersey and Senator Robert Packwood of Oregon. The 
outcomes in their cases are representative of the modern trend; like 
several senators before them, both men resigned their seats only 
after several months of incessant media scrutinyY4 
Sharply divergent conclusions might be drawn from this 
historical evidence. One view is that the system the Framers 
envisioned for removing rogue senators has worked, if somewhat 
imperfectly. While there have been only twenty-three recorded 
expulsions, the mere threat of expulsion-aided, especially in recent 
cases, by an increasingly vigilant press-has caused the resignation 
of many others accused of misconduct. But that view ignores two 
important points. First, those who granted the power abused in the 
first instance-the voters-have a legitimate claim to sit in 
judgment of a senator accused of misconduct or incompetency. If 
the people have a basic right to be represented by a senator of 
their choice, that right should also include the concomitant right to 
correct a grievous electoral mistake, even before the next election. 
Senators Packwood and Williams, for example, ultimately were 
persuaded to change their minds and to not attempt to hold onto 
their seats amid ethics complaints and charges of sexual harassment 
and bribery. Had they not resigned, it seems unlikely that these 
men would have been the first senators in history to be expelled 
absent charges of treason or disloyalty to country.135 Moreover, 
_ .. 133. Senate Cases, supra note 132; 2 HINDS, supra note 131, § 1278. 
134. Senator Packwood was outwardly defiant when the allegations against him originally 
surfaced. Packwood vowed to fight the charges, and he stated in an interview with the 
Associated Press that he should not be expelled from the Senate even if the ethics committee 
found him guilty. He argued (correctly) that the only Senators who have been expelled were 
found guilty of treason and that his alleged offenses were not comparable. See Helen Dewar, 
Packwood Launches Media Defense, WASH. POST, August 17, 1995, at A7. 
135. Madison, according to his own notes, "observed that the right of expulsion ... was 
too important to be exercised by a bare majority of a quorum: and in emergencies might be 
dangerously abused." See 2 FARRAND, supra note 13, at 254. He moved that "with the 
concurrence of 2/3" be inserted. /d. But Governeur Morris pointed out that a two-thirds 
requirement "may produce abuses on the side of the minority. A few men from factious 
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if the Senate should fail to act, as two hundred years of experience 
suggests it will in all but the most outrageous cases, voters are left 
only to rely upon the good will and honesty of the senator accused 
of misconduct. That remedy, as Senator Packwood's early defiance 
demonstrates, gives the people no recourse. 
Second, there continues to be much confusion concerning the 
proper boundaries of the power to expel. The Constitution is silent 
as to the offenses which would cause a senator to be expelledY6 
While the Supreme Court has indicated that the power to expel is 
a broad one, it is not unlimited.137 When the Senate considers 
punishment of any kind for its members, it looks first to see 
whether there has been a breach of any Senate rule. In addition, 
the Senate and the Ethics Committee have long held that the 
institution has the right to punish conduct that violates the 
"established norms" of the Senate, even if such conduct is not 
explicitly prohibited by Senate rules.138 But what constitutes an 
"established norm" is far from clear. 
In practice, it is impossible to conceive that the Senate would 
exercise its power to expel in certain cases involving conduct 
reprehensible to the voting public, such as instances in which the 
chamber concludes that a senator's conduct has become an 
embarrassment to voters or to its own ranks, when a senator fails 
to fulfill any campaign platform promises, or through prolonged 
absence the senator fails to attend to any senatorial duties.139 
motives may keep in a member who ought to be expelled." /d. 
136. See United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 519 (1972) ("An accused Member is 
judged by no specifically articulated standards .... "). As the Brewster Court observed, 
"Congress is ill-equipped to investigate, try, and punish its Members for a wide range of 
behavior that is loosely and incidentally related to the legislative process." /d. at 518. 
137. The Supreme Court held in In re Chapman, 161 U.S. 661 (1897), that "[t]he right 
to expel extends to all cases where the offense is such as in the judgment of the Senate is 
inconsistent with the trust and duty of a member." /d. at 669-70. There are obvious 
constitutional limitations on the right to expel, such as the rights to freedom of speech· and 
religion, as well as due process and equal protection constraints. See McLaughlin, supra note 
106, at 50-51. 
138. Efforts by the Senate to punish its own on the basis of a violation of established 
norms have been controversial. See Simpson, Chances of Enforcing, supra note 10 (noting 
that Senator Alan Cranston's objection to use of this ground to punish him for alleged in-
volvement with Charles Keating). No senator has ever even been threatened with expulsion 
for a violation of Senate "norms." 
139. Although Senate rules prohibit Senators from being absent from service without 
leave, the advent of airline travel appears to have made prolonged absences the rule rather 
than the exception. A few Senators have been absent for periods greater than two years due 
to illness or other circumstances. Due to the infirmities of old age, Carter Glass (D-Va.) was 
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These circumstances appear to be matters solely between the 
senator and constituents of the senator's state. Further, the Senate 
apparently does not believe that it has the power to expel a 
member for misconduct committed either during prior Congresses 
or before entering the Senate.140 Voters confronted with revela-
tions of past misconduct after an election is held, as were the voters 
of Oregon in the case of Senator Packwood, apparently have no 
recourse whatsoever under the Constitution.141 
It appears that expulsion is likely to be considered only in 
cases involving official misconduct while in office, and then only 
when that misconduct rises to the level of an impeachable offense. 
The grounds for impeachment, as set forth in Article II, Section 4, 
are narrow; they are limited to "treason, bribery, or other high 
crimes and misdemeanors. "142 The constitutional debates make 
clear that the impeachment provisions were aimed at preventing 
"the possibility of tyrannical, oppressive, corrupt and willful use of 
the power connected with a public office."143 In short, expulsion, 
like impeachment, probably is limited to cases involving an 
indictable offense arising from official duties, such as bribery of a 
senator.144 Impeachment itself, even if it were an available 
absent from June 1942 until his death on May 28, 1946. See ROBERT C. BYRD, THE SENATE 
1798-1989, HISTORICAL STATISTICS 1789-1992, 673 (Wendy Wolff ed. 1988). Karl Earl 
Mundt (R-S.D.) was absent from November 1969 to January 1973 after he suffered a stroke. 
He refused to resign and served until the expiration of his term. /d. 
140. See 2 HINDS, supra note 131, §§ 1283-1289; see also Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 
486, 508-09 (1969) (discussing power to expel for prior misconduct). Senate scholar George 
Haynes has called this the "twilight zone of the Senate's jurisdiction." 1 HAYNES, supra note 
4, at 189. For a view that the power to expel for prior misconduct is desirable, see Note, 
supra note 106, at 684. Congress has far greater latitude in punishing its Members than in 
expelling them. See McLaughlin, supra note 106, at 60-66. 
, 141. The WASHINGTON POST broke the story about Senator Packwood's alleged sexual 
harassment 19 days after Packwood won a fifth term. Packwood won the election by just 4% 
of the vote. See Simpson, Senate Ethics Staff, supra note 10. 
142. U.S. CONST., art. II, § 4 provides: "The President, Vice President and all civil 
Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and 
Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors." 
143. John D. Feerick, Impeaching Federal Judges: A Study of the Constitutional 
Provisions, 39 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 53 (1970). 
144. See McLaughlin, supra note 106, at 49 ("[T]o be impeachable, the conduct in 
question must either be an indictable offense which involves serious consequences to the 
United States or, if not an indictable offense, one which involves malicious or corrupt acts 
in the discharge of official duties, causing great detriment to the United States."). 
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option, 145 punishes only malfeasance in office, not misfeasance or 
nonfeasance, and graft is in any event difficult to prove. 
B. The Source of Consent 
A recall amendment would not represent the first attempt by 
the states to gain direct control of the United States Senate. 
During the second quarter of the nineteenth century, the practice 
of instruction-the requirement that a state's senators vote on an 
issue according to the state legislature's majority view-was 
prevalent in many states.146 Instruction was not based on any 
power granted by the Constitution, but rather by then-accepted 
theories of representative government. States supporting Jefferso-
nian Republicans or Jacksonian Democrats in the years 1800-1840 
were most inclined to practice instruction.147 Many senators 
simply ignored instructions; however, others were actually forced 
to resign when they disobeyed their legislatures. Such cases were, 
in practical effect, the very first recall movements.148 
But voters were not satisfied with having their state legislatures 
instruct their senators on certain issues. They wanted to choose 
directly who would represent them in the Senate. Though the 
Constitution did not expressly grant them the power to do so, 
States moved at the beginning of the twentieth century to take 
popular control of senatorial elections. In 1901, Oregon enacted a 
145. An impeachment proceeding has been brought against only one Senator. On July 
7, 1797, the House decided to bring impeachment proceedings against William Blount of 
Tennessee. See Senate Cases, supra note 132, at 3. Blount was frrst expelled from the 
Senate; he then attacked the jurisdiction of the Senate to try him for impeachment. See id. 
His claim that he could not be a "civil officer" of the United States subject to impeachment 
~as upheld by the Senate when it dismissed the impeachment proceedings. See id. This 
result has been considered a precedent for the proposition that Members of Congress are not 
impeachable. 
146. For a detailed history of the practice of instruction, see 2 HAYNES, supra note 4, at 
1025-34; see also JayS. Bybee, Ulysses at the Mast: Democracy, Federalism, and the Sirens' 
Song of the Seventeenth Amendment, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 500, 517-28 (1997) (describing 
constitutional debates over instruction and early practice). Members of the Continental 
Congress considered binding the instructions received from their. state legislatures, and 
delegates to the Philadelphia Convention also came with instructions. See HAYNES, supra 
note 4, at 1025. 
147. See id. at 1027-28. 
148. After 1840 the practice of instructing senators declined for various reasons. Among 
the various causes for the decline were the blatantly partisan use of instruction in abolitionist 
and states' rights issues and mounting objections to the removal of respected senators who 
were perceived to have voted according to their best judgment. See CRONIN, supra note 8, 
at 26. 
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primary law under which voters expressed their choice for senator 
by precisely the same process as that used in electing their 
governor.149 Many states followed Oregon's lead and adopted 
what came to be known as the "Oregon System" for the popular 
choice of senators.150 
Then came the ratification after a century-long struggle of the 
Seventeenth Amendment, which provided for the direct election of 
senators.151 Senate scholar George Haynes has provided a picture 
of historical events leading up to ratification of the Seventeenth 
Amendment: 
For some years before the opening of the new century, 
conditions had been ripening toward that change. The election 
of Senators by direct vote of the people was a later phase of the 
movement to democratize American government, a movement 
which had begun to manifest itself many years earlier in the 
broadening of the suffrage, the multiplication of elective offices 
and the shortening of their terms, the putting of constitutional 
curbs upon the power of state legislatures, and the widespread 
adoption of the initiative and referendum, and the recall. 152 
Popular opinion and the nation's leaders eventually came to 
embrace the view that under the system of indirect election by state 
legislatures, many senators were indifferent to popular demands, 
and obligated instead to corporations that could often influence the 
senators' elections. In addition, there was widespread concern over 
corruption and deadlock occurring in the state legislatures.153 
Direct election was to eradicate the evils associated with election 
by a third party agent, "to act as a democratic vaccine to immunize 
149. See 1 HAYNES, supra note 4, at 98-104. 
150. See id. 
, 151. See id. at 96 n.1 (noting that the first resolution proposing constitutional amendment 
introduced in 1826); see also BYRD, supra note 139, at 402 (noting that the movement to 
achieve direct election of Senators spanned from 1826 to 1912). The Seventeenth Amend-
ment states: 
The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each 
State, elected by the people thereof, for six years; and each Senator shall have one 
vote. The electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors 
of the most numerous branch of the State legislatures. 
U.S. CONST. amend XVII. 
152. See 2 HAYNES, supra note 4, at 1041. 
153. See 1 id. at 85-95 (describing deadlocks, "stampeded elections," bribery, corruption, 
vacancies, and the corruption of state politics). 
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the Senate from corrupt and ineffective representation."154 The 
democratic purpose of the Seventeenth Amendment, plainly 
reflected in its text requiring election "by the people," was to 
· increase accountability by distributing the vote to more individuals 
than could be bought or corrupted.155 The Framers intended the 
Senate to be an elite chamber, isolated from the democratic 
demands of the House. But the Seventeenth Amendment 
abolished the most remarkable difference between the chambers by 
providing for direct elections. Whatever reservations the Framers 
may have held concerning popular democracy, the people in 1913 
succeeded in transforming the national legislature into a body 
springing in both branches from popular vote and thus depending 
wholly on the nation's will.156 
C. The Merits of State Experimentation 
In contrast to the power of expulsion, the proposed alterna-
tive-the recall device-has a long and instructive history in the 
United States. Hamilton's objection that a few years' experience 
under the Articles of Confederation was insufficient evidence to 
pass on the merits of recall has been answered, at least at the state 
and local levels of government. According to one scholar of 
popular democracy, who conducted a study a decade ago, as many 
as 4,000 to 5,000 recall elections have been held, and several 
thousand more have been begun but failed to qualify for lack of 
signatures.157 The nation's experience with the recall device 
154. Laura E. Little, An Excursion Into the Uncharted Waters of the Seventeenth 
Amendment, 64 TEMP. L. REv. 629, 640 (1991). 
155. See id. at 637, 642; see also S. REP. No. 60-518, at 9 (1908) ("Direct responsibility 
breeds honesty ... it detects and defeats the unworthy, the incompetent, and the corrupt."); 
47 CONG. REc. S1913 (1911) ("(T]he more complete domination you give to the people the 
nearer you come to realizing the ideal which has been in the hearts and brains of patriots 
since the days of Jefferson.") (statement of Senator Reed). The few court decisions to 
review the history of the Seventeenth Amendment have recognized and embraced its 
democratic purpose. See, e.g., Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 143 (1943) 
(stating that the "[o]bject of the Seventeenth Amendment was to make [the Senate] more 
responsive to the public will."); Valenti v. Rockefeller, 292 F. Supp. 851, 864 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) 
("[T]he clear purpose of the Seventeenth Amendment was to give effect to the direct voice 
of the people in the selection of Senators."), atfd mem., 393 U.S. 405 (1969). 
156. Many States threatened a convention to consider popular election of senators, if the 
more customary channel of Congressional consideration failed. Scholars have stressed that 
this determination on the part of the States forced Congress to submit the amendment rather 
than risk an open convention. See, e.g., Gordon E. Sherman, The Recent Constitutional 
Amendments, 23 YALE L.J. 129, 146 (1913); 1 HAYNES, supra note 4, at 107. 
157. See CRONIN, supra note 8, at 142. 
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provides at least an approximation of the experience to be expected 
should the people be granted the power to recall United States 
Senators. Proponents of a recall amendment would not be writing 
on a blank slate. 
The terms of debate concerning recall of public officials have 
not changed substantially since the Framers considered the issue in 
1787. Critics of senatorial recall likely would raise objections 
similar to those advanced by Hamilton and the Federalists at the 
New York ratifying convention. A close examination, however, of 
the states' and localities' experience with recall reveals that those 
concerns are unfounded. 
Before reaching the primary concerns expressed by recall 
detractors, however, it makes sense to briefly discuss one potential 
criticism that the Framers did not consider- the issue of uniformity. 
The Thornton Court expressed reservations about permitting 
individual States to formulate diverse qualifications for their 
congressional representatives. The Court feared that such diversity 
would result in a "patchwork" that would be inconsistent with the 
Framers' vision of a uniform national legislature representing the 
people of the United States.158 
For recall, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to set forth 
uniform standards in a constitutional amendment. Placing the 
power to promulgate such requirements in the Senate would defeat 
the spirit, if not the very purpose, of a recall amendment by 
allowing the Senate to interpret narrowly the grounds for recall. 
There is no serious difficulty in allowing the states to formulate 
disparate requirements for the exercise of recall. As one scholar 
has said: 
There is no valid reason why uniformity of grounds for recall, 
methods, and occasions must be imposed upon all the states. 
If one state deems conviction for bribery sufficient, another 
considers fraud sufficient, and a third views chronic alcoholism 
or regular absence from chambers sufficient, that is their right, 
and only theirs, to decide.159 
State laws that set forth individual recall requirements do not 
(unlike, say, state laws affecting the flow of commerce) affect the 
interests of any other state. Just as states may prescribe various 
158. See United States Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 822 (1995). 
159. ANTIEAU, supra note 124, at 160. 
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"time, place, and manner" restrictions for senatorial elections, 160 
so too should the voters of a state decide whether, and under what 
circumstances, their senators will continue to serve in office. Only 
such diversity will truly effectuate the power of the people of each 
state to decide who will represent them in the Senate. 
But a raw assertion of state power is, at best, an incomplete 
answer to the legitimate concerns raised in Thornton. The better 
answer is that there is a long history of state differences concerning 
the election of senators. For example, the legislatures' methods for 
choosing senators varied under Article I, Section 3, as did their 
criteria for election.161 And two of the three minimum require-
ments in Article I, Section 3-citizenship and inhabitancy-at the 
time the Constitution was adopted depended entirely on state 
law.162 The strong inference from history is that state experimen-
tation and variety, not uniformity, was expected in the area of 
congressional elections. There is no reason to prohibit that same 
variety of experience with regard to recall. 
The arguments against recall advanced at the New York 
convention also do not stand up to careful scrutiny. One of the 
primary arguments first advanced by recall opponents at the New 
York ratifying convention was that the mere threat of a recall 
election would destroy the deliberative nature of the Senate and 
render senators, like representatives, slaves to mob sentiment.163 
The argument that senators should be shielded from democratic 
concerns is not new. Opponents of the Seventeenth Amendment 
similarly predicted that direct elections would make the Senate a 
mere duplicate of the House, subject to frequent waves of passion, 
flighty decisions, and irresponsible actions that often accompany 
popular clamor.164 The central opposition to popular control 
160. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (granting state legislatures the power to prescribe the 
"Times, Places and Manner" of holding elections for senators and representatives). 
161. At the first elections for Senators, in some legislatures both houses voted jointly 
(e.g., Virginia and New Jersey). See 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL 
ELECTIONS 1788-1790 281 (G. DenBoer, et al. eds., 1984); 3 id. 25 (1986). Some voted sepa-
rately (e.g. Massachusetts and Connecticut). 1 id. 514-20; 2 id. 28. New Hampshire 
apparently had one house nominate, the other approve. 1 id. 783. New York could not 
agree on any procedure. 3 id. 513. Maryland formally required that one Senator reside on 
the Eastern Shore, the other on the Western Shore. 2 id. 146-49. 
162. See JAMES H. KETTNER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP, 1608-
1870 213-18 (1978). 
163. See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text. 
164. See 2 HAYNES, supra note 4, at 1084. 
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stands on rather shaky ground when measured against current 
political reality. It appears to be based on the naive assumption 
that senators, unlike members of the lower House, do not already 
seek to curry favor with voters and special interests in order to 
secure reelection. Hamilton and others may have envisioned a 
system in which senators would conduct themselves differently from 
their House colleagues, but the Framers were sometimes poor 
predictors.165 Study after study gives the lie to the assumption 
that senators stand above the wishes of their constituents, as does 
the remarkable success of incumbents in the Senate, particularly in 
recent years.166 Like their colleagues in the House, senators 
begin to prepare for reelection almost as soon as they unpack their 
bags in the nation's capital. 
A properly drafted recall law would not add appreciably to a 
senator's already pressing need to weigh constituent views. 
Properly conceived and exercised, the recall would serve not as a 
referendum for single issues like abortion or a balanced budget, but 
rather would provide the voters with a means of removing a 
senator who has perpetrated an extraordinary breach of the public 
trust, yet who falls outside the Senate's apparently narrow 
jurisdiction to expel. 
Further, eighty years of experience at the state and local level 
suggest that providing for popular recall of senators would not, as 
Hamilton and other Federalists argued, result in chaos and endless 
confusion. In his careful study of the initiative, referendum, and 
recall, Professor Cronin found no evidence to support the conten-
tion that the recall device acts as an invitation to unruly, impatient 
action or represents a hazard to representative government.167 At 
least at the state and local level, recall has not been a disruptive 
165. To take just one example, the Framers had expected slavery to wither away of its 
own accord and therefore made no provision in the event that it did not. 
166. Studies of Senators' behavior indicate that, like their House counterparts, Senators 
usually moderate their ideological positions to reflect their constituents' opinions, especially 
as reelection nears. See, e.g., ROBERT S. ERIKSON & GERALD C. WRIGHT, VOTERS, 
CANDIDATES, AND ISSUES IN CONGRESSIONAL ELECfiONS, IN CONGRESS RECONSIDERED 
112 (Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce I. Oppenheimer, eds.) (5th ed.) (1993). The authors state: 
"Incumbents like to stay elected, and they know that the way to do this is to provide constit-
uents with what they want." !d. In recent years, the rate of return for Senate incumbents 
has reached or exceeded 90%. See Incumbent Reelection Rates 1960-1990, in Congressional 
Quarterly's Guide to Congress 705 (4th ed. 1991); NORMAN ORNSTEIN ET AL., VITAL 
STATISTICS ON CONGRESS 1993-1994 58-59 (1993). The rate of return of Senate incumbents 
who ran in 1994 was 92%. ld. 
167. CRONIN, supra note 8, at 140-43. 
604 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW [103:3 
force. 168 Professor Cronin observed that "recall, like impeach-
ment, is a cumbersome, complicated, last-resort procedure that 
requires significant organizational stamina, drive, and intensity to 
reach the ballot box stage."169 Such safeguards have ensured that 
the recall is used infrequently, especially against elected state 
officials. As Cronin discovered: 
Only one governor and a handful of other statewide-elected 
officials have been recalled. Several state legislators have been 
recalled, including two in California in 1913, two in Idaho in 
1971, two in Michigan in 1983, and one in Oregon in 1988. 
About forty recalls have been mounted to oust state officials in 
California, but all except two have failed for lack of signatures. 
Recall drives against governors have been mounted in recent 
years but failed to obtain adequate signatures in California, 
Louisiana, and Michigan.170 
The odds that senators would be, in Robert Livingston's words, 
"appointed one day and recalled the next,"171 appear slim indeed. 
Other critics of recall would likely maintain, as did Hamilton 
and the Federalists who attended the New York convention, that 
the spectre of a recall election will commit legislators to "zero-risk" 
positions, and render them timid. But scholars who have studied 
the exercise of the recall against state and local government 
officials have concluded that there is "no evidence that [recall] has 
in this way seriously handicapped constructive public service. "172 
168. It is possible, though certainly not likely, that Robert Livingston's vision of govern-
ment annihilation through recall might materialize. But, John Lansing answered that 
criticism adequately in 1787-a recall amendment, he said, could contain a clause obliging 
a state, in the event of a recall, to choose immediately another senator to fill the vacancy. 
See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text. The Constitution already contains similar 
requirements in cases of exclusion or expulsion. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 4. That part 
of the Constitution provides: "When vacancies happen in the Representation from any State, 
the Executive Authority thereof shall issue Writs of Election to fill such Vacancies:;. 
Additionally, the Seventeenth Amendment provides that in the case of the Senate the 
legislature of any state may empower the executive thereof to make temporary appointments 
until the people fill the vacancies by election as the legislature may direct. !d. amend. XVII, 
cl. 2. 
169. CRONIN, supra note 8, at 142-43. 
170. ld. at 127. Professor Cronin noted: "Probably as many as 2,000 county and 
municipal officials have been discharged around the country since Los Angeles became the 
first local government to adopt the recall in 1903." ld. at 128. 
171. 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 14, at 291. 
172. FREDERICK L. BIRD & FRANCES M. RYAN, THE RECALL OF PuBLIC OFFICERS 353 
(1930). 
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As Professor Cronin noted in his study, conservative positions are 
a natural consequence of direct elections: 
A few officials probably minimize risktaking because of the 
recall. It is doubtful, however, that the recall device encourages 
this any more than the fact that they must stand for reelection. 
Politicians are generally cautious. By definition they want to 
retain majority and plurality support. Democratic elections 
encourage this. Recall is merely an additional device-a form 
of insurance.173 
Nor has the existence of recall inhibited qualified and talented 
candidates from seeking office, as Hamilton feared it might deter 
senators. Indeed, Professor Cronin said of this claim lodged against 
the recall device: "This specter of the recall turning potential 
elected officials into cowards unwilling to run is an exaggera-
tion."174 
The available evidence also does not support the criticism, 
lodged by Robert Livingston and other Federalists, that many 
would succeed in using the recall to ruin an official for partisan 
gain. A study of recall efforts in Los Angeles, where more than 
forty-five have occurred, found that voters rejected politically 
inspired recalls-movements in which "sour grapes" or personal 
feuds and ambitions were the chief reason behind the recall effort. 
As Professor Cronin explained: 
A study of recall efforts in Los Angeles [showed 
that] ... Los Angeles voters have generally preferred to reserve 
the recall for its originally intended use (to weed out malfea-
sance and corruption) and to settle political questions at regular 
elections. The same can be said of most citizens elsewhere who 
have exercised the right of recall. 175 
When efforts to abuse recall have arisen, voters generally have 
been vigilant against exploitation and harassment. "The arbitrary 
or wanton exercise of the recall to displace or harass conscientious 
officials," Cronin found, "usually backfires."176 "On balance," 
173. CRONIN, supra note 8, at 148-49. 
174. /d. at 145. 
175. /d. at 143 (citation omitted). 
176. /d. at 152. This is precisely what occurred in the highly publicized recall challenge 
involving then-San Francisco Mayor Dianne Feinstein. Feinstein was guilty of neither crinle 
nor incompetence of any sort, and 81% of those who voted rejected the recall attempt. !d. 
at 141. 
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Cronin concluded, "the recall has been mainly used to weed out 
incompetent, arbitrary, or corrupt officials. It is a positive device 
reminding officials that they are temporary agents of the public 
they serve. "177 
It is important to note also that a United States Senator would 
hardly be defenseless in the face of bogus charges. Senators, 
particularly long-time incumbents, are not ordinary government 
officials. Placed at their disposal are taxpayer-furnished staffs, 
expense accounts, offices in their districts, media broadcast studios 
and press aides, travel allowances, free postage privileges, free 
stationery, and easy access to television news and talk shows.178 
Such resources would be more than sufficient to allow a challenged 
incumbent senator to answer any charges. 
Professor Cronin supports state and local recall measures, but 
opposes recall of senators on the ground that the six-year term for 
senators was "deliberately designed to take a larger view of the 
national interest."179 This view, however, takes too simplistic an 
approach to the senator's role in our federal system. While it is 
true that the Framers intended senators' long terms to insulate 
them from state interests, the Framers also held out the Senate as 
the guardian of state sovereignty through equal representation 
coupled with election by the state legislatures.180 The loyalty of 
senators always has been divided between state and Union. What 
Hamilton could not have answered, and what Cronin failed even to 
consider, is what effect the Seventeenth Amendment has had on 
senatorial loyalties. While the Seventeenth Amendment effected 
no organic change in the structure of the Seriate, one of its primary 
purposes was to make the Senate more responsive to the will of the 
people. The vision of the detached and nation-minded senator 
ignores both the Framers' statements and, to an even greater 
degree, the current derivation of the Senate. 
177. /d. at 243. 
178. See, e.g., 39 U.S.C. §§ 3210, 3211, 3212 (1994) (franked mail, including "mass 
mailings"); 2 U.S.C. § 123b-1 (1994) (Senate recording studio); id. § 58a (telecommunications 
services); id. §§57, 58c (office expense allowances); id. § 332 (personal staff); id. §§ 43, 43b, 
58 (travel allowances); id. § 46b-1 (stationery); id. § 59 (offices in home state). 
179. CRONIN, supra note 8, at 244. Hamilton also advanced this structural argument. 
180. The contradiction is apparent in THE FEDERALIST No. 62, in which Madison stated 
that the Senate represented the portion of sovereignty remaining to the States, while in No. 
63 he approvingly anticipated the Senators' stronger "sense of national character" compared 
to House Members, due to the former's longer terms and less close ties with their constitu-
ents. 
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Contrary to the concerns expressed in New York and at other 
state conventions in 1787, experience has demonstrated that in 
practice the recall weapon has been used most often when arbitrary 
or incompetent officials have aroused sufficient anger in the public 
to generate significant support for a recall effort. States with recall 
laws have not experienced weakened government, timid legislators, 
or abuse by political or ideological groups. Nor have they suffered 
a paucity of talented candidates interested in running for office. 
As with any experiment of like scale, the state and local 
experience has not all been positive. There have been occasional 
misfires and abuses, particularly at the level of local government. 
The recall has sometimes been used to oust a local official because 
of the official's position on an individual policy issue, for petty 
partisan revenge, harassment, or for no apparent reason at all.181 
Some scholars also have complained that the recall is being used by 
well-funded interest groups to serve their particular interests.182 
And, of course, it is very expensive for governments to check 
petition signatures and conduct recall elections. But scholars and 
even many of the officials who have been targets of recall move-
ments agree that occasional abuse and expense is not sufficient 
cause to abandon the recall altogether. Rather, constructive 
proposals have been offered, and enacted by state legislatures, 
which provide safeguards against abuse and render the recall device 
truly a weapon of last resort. 
V. A (Cautious) Proposal for Senatorial Recall 
As I have argued above, recall is an important tool for popular 
monitoring of senators and effectuates the peoples' interest in 
"choosing whom they please to govern them." Because recall is 
such a potent weapon, however, the essential objective should be 
to restrict its use to true emergencies. As under the Articles of 
181. See Mack, supra note 94, at 618-20 (describing "recall frenzy" in Nebraska in late 
1980s); ZIMMERMAN, supra note 104, at 125-28 (describing how two Democratic Michigan 
state senators were singled out for recall primarily to give the Republican party a majority 
in the Senate); see also CRONIN, supra note 8, at 241 (explaining how in San Francisco "a 
strident, intense and irresponsible group used recall mainly to embarrass Mayor Diane 
Feinstein"). Paul Horcher, a Republican in the California Assembly, was recalled on May 
17, 1995, apparently for providing the vote that kept Democratic Assembly Speaker Willie 
L. Brown, Jr. in power, denying the GOP its first majority in the Assembly since 1970. See 
William Claiborne, Voters Oust Brown Ally in California, THE WASH. POST, May 18, 1995, 
at A18. 
182. See ZIMMERMAN, supra note 104, at 126. 
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Confederation, the principal influence of the recall should derive 
from its potential, not its actual, use. Recall efforts should be 
encouraged only in the most serious situations, such as when a 
senator has been inexcusably negligent in carrying out senatorial 
duties, has engaged in reprehensible conduct (regardless of whether 
related to official duties or whether such conduct comprises treason 
or a felony), or has become incompetent for some reason. 
The key to ensuring a healthy exercise of the recall lies in the 
first instance in the signature requirement. A substantial number 
of signatures must be required to protect senators from the 
irritation of fringe groups or mere partisan opposition, yet the 
threshold must be low enough to allow a real possibility of 
removal.183 The main reason for the infrequent use of the recall 
device in the largest cities or against elected state officials is the 
large number of signatures needed to trigger a recall election. A 
recall of the governor of California, for example, would require 
more than 800,000 signatures to reach the ballot.184 It is highly 
unlikely that any single issue could be used to mobilize such a great 
number of voters to move a senator's recall from office. 
Obviously, states should proceed with utmost caution in 
fashioning the requirements for recalling United States Senators. 
The scorn and fear that colored the Framers' views of factions have 
dissipated to a considerable degree, but the danger that recall will 
render senators beholden to minority factions still exists in some 
measure. To ensure that the passions of a small minority will not 
force a senator to face a recall election, states should adopt 
signature requirements toward the higher end of the scale. A 
twenty-five percent signature requirement, common in many recall 
statutes, would be sufficiently large to deter spurious movements, 
yet sufficiently attainable to allow for judicious use. Moreover, to 
further guard against minority control, the signature requirement 
should be based on the percentage of registered voters, not on a 
percentage of people voting in a given election. This will ensure 
that a low turnout in a prior election will not lead to easy removal. 
183. Providing necessary safeguards while still placing the recall device within reach of 
voters has proved a difficult task indeed. States have experimented with signature 
requirements ranging from a low of five percent to a high of forty percent. See, e.g., FLA. 
STAT. ANN. § 100.361(1)(a)(6) (West 1982) (5% requirement); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-4311 
(1993) (40% requirement). The various signature requirements under state recall laws are 
presented in CRONIN, supra note 8, at 126-27. 
184. See CAL. CONST., art. 2, § 14; CAL. ELEC. CODE § 11221(c)(1) (West 1996). 
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Finally, because the stakes are so high, states should seriously 
consider requiring that a supermajority vote in favor of recall of a 
United States Senator should a petition drive succeed in forcing an 
election. 
Another concern regarding any recall measures is the potential 
for harassment and the possible disruption of representative 
government that a recall effort can engender. To address this 
problem, a recall statute should require: (a) a clear statement of 
the reasons for the recall effort; (b) a showing of cause (reviewable 
for sufficiency in state courts); (c) a sworn affirmation of good faith 
knowledge concerning the truth of the allegations asserted; and (d) 
mandatory criminal sanctions for petitioners who knowingly 
circulate a recall petition with false allegations.185 
To further guard against abuse of the recall power by well-
funded interest groups, any recall measure should also include: (a) 
a requirement that the petitioning parties identify themselves; (b) 
signature verification; (c) financial disclosure by the petitioning 
parties; and (e) public hearings on the merits of a recall peti-
tion.186 
Lastly, the grounds for recall should be flexible. Those states 
that currently prescribe narrow grounds for recall should loosen 
their standards as applied to United States Senators. Limiting 
recall to instances of official misconduct would leave voters in no 
better position than they are in under the Senate's power to expel. 
Such narrowly drafted laws would defeat the voters' ability to 
remove a senator whose prior egregious acts come to light only 
after a term of office has commenced. 
In response to these and other calls for reform, and in 
particular to remedy instances of abuse, states have been fine-
tuning their recall laws in the directions suggested.187 There is no 
guarantee that reform of state recall laws will remove the possibili-
ty of abuse, harassment, or error. A determined, well-financed 
faction may succeed in at least subjecting a senator to an expensive 
and burdensome recall process. And voters make mistakes (which 
is one reason why they need the recall power to begin with). State 
experimentation with senatorial recall may come at the expense of 
185. See Mack, supra note 94, at 634-39. 
186. See CRONIN, supra note 8, at 245-46. 
187. For example, Nebraska has been attempting to reform its recall law. See Mack, 
supra note 94, at 632-34. 
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good legislators. Yet while voters occasionally abuse the franchise 
and elect unqualified senators, no one has argued that we ought to 
revert to the original framework, and that the people should be 
denied the right to choose who will represent them in the United 
States Senate. Proponents of the Seventeenth Amendment were 
willing to accept the occasional lapse of judgment in the interest of 
greater accountability and control. Likewise, the possibility that 
the recall weapon occasionally may be misfired should not stand as 
a dispositive reason to reject the device. 
VI. Conclusion 
If the country learned anything from the constitutional crisis 
brought about by the impeachment proceedings involving President 
Clinton, it was that the people can indeed put aside self-interest 
and partisanship for the common good. In other words, they 
proved themselves capable of choosing whom they please to govern 
them. The Framers' two-thirds vote r~quirement may have been 
the safeguard that ultimately prevented the president's impeach-
ment, but the peoples' voices were also heard throughout the 
process that led to President Clinton's acquittal. 
As the drive for term limits demonstrated, the people of the 
states continue to seek accountability for and control of their 
federal representatives. Voting occasionally does not appear to 
satisfy their thirst for direct dem9cracy. The Supreme Court has 
held that term limits, however popular, are beyond the states' 
constitutional powers. It may be that the Court's condemnation of 
state experimentation that affects. Congress also encompasses the 
several state recall measures that have been passed but never 
implemented due to lingering doubts concerning their constitution-
ality. That would be unfortunate, for state recall measures aimed 
at rogue senators are a far more direct and salutary method for 
enforcing accountability than term limits. Such measures, if 
exercised responsibly under various safeguards, are a valuable 
component of the right granted to the people by the Seventeenth 
Amendment. The evidence thus far from the state and local 
exercise of the recall power suggests that the people are capable of 
implementing recall responsibly. 
There can, of course, be no guarantees against abuse, no 
matter what safeguards accompany the power of recall. But errors 
and misfires are the sometimes heavy price we pay for the 
opportunity to experiment made possible by the federal system. 
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Prejudice against common citizens should not, as Justice Holmes 
cautioned, "prevent the making of social experiments that an 
important part of the community desires, in the insulated chambers 
afforded by the several States, even though the experiments may 
seem futile or even noxious .... "188 Senators, like the Federal-
ists in New York, may consider a recall weapon in the hands of the 
people an unnecessary threat to their·continuation in office. But 
amendments such as the Seventeenth stand as proof that under the 
Constitution the people have the last word. 
188. Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 344 (1921) (Holmes, J., dissenting opinion). 
